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Deposits held at Federal Reserve Banks are an essential input to the business activity of most 
depository institutions in the United States.   Managing these deposits is an important and 
complex inventory problem, for two reasons. First, Federal Reserve regulations require that 
depository institutions hold certain amounts of such deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks to 
satisfy statutory reserve requirements against  customers’ transaction accounts (demand 
deposits and other checkable deposits). Second, some inventory of such deposits is essential 
for banks to operate one of their core lines of business: furnishing payment services to 
households and firms. including wire transfers, ACH payments, and check clearing settlement. 
Because the Federal Reserve does not pay interest on such deposits used to satisfy statutory 
reserve requirements, banks seek to minimize their inventory of such deposits. In 1994, the 
banking industry introduced a new inventory management tool for such deposits, the retail 
deposit sweep program, which avoids the statutory requirement by reclassifying transaction 
deposits as savings deposits. In this analysis, we examine two algorithms for operating such 
sweeps programs within the limits of Federal Reserve regulations.  
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1.   Introduction 
 
Deposits held at Federal Reserve Banks are an essential input to the business activity of most 
depository institutions in the United States.   Managing these deposits is an important and 
complex inventory problem, for two reasons. First, Federal Reserve regulations require that 
depository institutions hold certain amounts of such deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks to 
satisfy statutory reserve requirements. Second, an inventory of such transaction deposits is 
essential for banks to operate one of their core lines of business: furnishing payments services 
to households and firms, including wire transfers, automated clearing house (ACH) payments, 
and check clearing settlement.  
 
As competitive firms, banks seek to maximize their profits while complying with 
applicable laws and regulations.  The Monetary Control Act of 1980 authorized the Federal 
Reserve to require banks and depository institutions to hold statutory reserves against 
transaction deposits (e.g., checking accounts); since early 1992, a 10 percent reserve-
requirement ratio has applied to deposit balances greater than approximately $50 million. Non-
transaction deposits (e.g., savings accounts) and most other bank liabilities are subject to a zero 
percent reserve-requirement ratio.  Federal Reserve regulations stipulate that only two bank 
assets may be used to satisfy statutory reserve requirements: deposits at the Federal Reserve 
Banks, and vault cash (cash in banks’ central vaults, in ATMs, and in transit, etc.).  Neither of 
these assets earns interest for the bank. Penalties are levied if these requirements are violated. 
 
Clever bank managers seek to minimize their holdings of these “sterile reserves.”  In 
1994, for this purpose, a large commercial bank invented the retail deposit sweep program.  In 
such a program, the bank links two companion accounts—a customer’s transaction account 
(demand deposit or similar checkable account), which we hereafter refer as the bank 
transaction account, or BTA, and a newly created money market deposit account (MMDA, 
similar to a savings account).  Funds are swept regularly from the BTA, where end of day 
balances are subject to a 10 percent statutory marginal reserve requirement, to the MMDA, 
which is not subject to any reserve requirement.  The MMDA account is invisible to the 
customer, and is solely a component of the inventory management scheme; transfers between 
accounts also are invisible to the customer. Unlike numerous earlier reserve-reduction schemes 
of banks, the Federal Reserve Board has not, as of this writing, objected to banks reducing their An Inventory Problem in Banks: Optimizing Retail Sweeps 
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required reserves via such schemes (see Appendix 1 for more details on Federal Reserve 
history with respect to sweep programs).   
 
In short,  the essence of a retail deposit sweep program is the ability of the bank to 
reclassify, for reserve-requirement purposes, transaction deposits, subject to a 10 percent 
reserve requirement, as saving deposits (specifically, MMDA), subject to a zero reserve 
requirement.  A retail deposit sweep, essentially, is keeping two sets of books so as to evade 
the “reserve requirement” tax collector. 
 
Since debits (e.g., check writing) can only be serviced from transaction accounts, it is 
optimal to always leave some funds in the transaction account and replenish the account from 
the companion MMDA, as required.  To discourage the use of the MMDA (a type of savings 
account) as if it were a checking account, Federal Reserve regulations (Regulation D) limit to a 
maximum of 6 the number of withdrawals that can be made from an MMDA account during a 
calendar month. These limits do not apply to transfers made by personally visiting a branch, or 
by ATM, or by phone.  The consequence of violating the six transfer limit is harsh: the entire 
amount that has been swept between the BTA and the MMDA becomes subject to the same 
statutory reserve requirement as if no sweep had been attempted at all.  Thus, it is generally 
optimal to move all remaining balances from the MMDA to the transaction account on the sixth 
transfer out of the MMDA account.   
 
Figure 1: Monthly sweep amounts and cumulative amount since 1994 
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Numerous legal interpretations (e.g., Ireland 1996) from the Federal Reserve emphasize 
the 6 transfers limit.  For a brokerage client with a balance of a million dollars, that would mean 
a hundred thousand dollars in additional reserves. Therefore, the sweep mechanism would 
have to ensure that no more than five transfers were necessary from MMDA to BTA every 
month. This need for judicious sweeping requires sophisticated computer software and 
algorithms.  
 
Data on the aggregate amount of deposits affected by retail deposit sweep activity is of 
modest quality, at best.  Commercial banks are not required to report data on sweep activity to 
the Federal Reserve.  Hence, in most cases, Federal Reserve staff have imputed the amount 
being swept from other deposit and reserves data.  Sweep activity grew slowly from its inception 
in January 1994 through mid-1995, and thereafter grew rapidly as banks concluded that the 
Federal Reserve would not move to prohibit such reserve-requirement reduction schemes.  As 
seen in Figure 1, the cumulative amount of sweep since 1994 reached about $654 billion by 
January 2005, or more than 50 percent of the total amount of transaction balances at banks and 
thrift institutions.  
 
Widespread use of sweep programs has significantly reduced the amount of required 
reserve balances that banks maintain at the Federal Reserve. As a result, even as aggregate 
transaction deposits (including the amounts in sweeps) has increased, the portion of total 
require reserves satisfied by vault cash has held almost steady, while the portion satisfied by  
Federal Reserve Bank deposits (so-called “required reserve balances”) has fallen; see Figure 2. 
In the past couple of years there has been a slight increase in reserve balances due to low 
interest rates. There is some concern among economists that this trend can increase volatility in 
the federal funds rate as the banks try to manage their accounts with very low balances 
(Bennett and Hilton 1997, Wrase 1998, Anderson and Rasche 2001, Anderson 2002a). 
 
Some economists have expressed concern that aggressive management of deposits of 
held at Federal Reserve Banks via sweep programs might increase federal funds rate volatility, 
an outcome regarded by the Federal Open Market Committee as harmful to monetary policy’s 
effectiveness.  According to Furfine (2000), “As recently as a decade ago, relatively high 
statutory reserve requirements created a fairly predictable demand for bank reserves, making 
interest rate targeting a relatively easy-to-implement policy choice for the Federal Reserve.  
Over the last 10 years, however, lower reserve requirements and the widespread adoption of An Inventory Problem in Banks: Optimizing Retail Sweeps 
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sweep accounts have precipitated a dramatic fall in required reserve balances.  These lower 
reserve balances may increase uncertainty in reserve demand, possibly complicating the Fed's 
ability to achieve the goals of monetary policy.”  And Clouse and Dow (2002) state, “Several 
countries have already moved to monetary systems without reserve requirements so that their 
demand for reserves is entirely a demand for excess reserves. The United States is also moving 
in that direction due to the adoption of retail sweep programs by commercial banks. These 
programs have resulted in significantly lower levels of required reserves, leaving some banks in 
the position of not needing to hold reserve balances to meet their reserve requirements. 
Understanding how this demand behaves is becoming an important issue in applied monetary 
economics.” 
 
Some events in recent years have portended an end to retail deposit sweep accounts.  
But, in our opinion, such events are not likely to reach fruition.  In a late 1990s Federal Reserve 
survey, a sample of sweeping banks responded they would discontinue retail deposit sweep 
programs if the Federal Reserve paid interest on deposits at the Federal Reserve Banks.  
Legislation to require the Federal Reserve to start paying interest on sterile reserve balances at 
the Fed has been introduced but failed to pass the Congress, e.g., the Bank Reserves 
Figure 2: Components of Reserves and Account Balances at the Fed 
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Modernization Act of 2000, and the more recent HR 758, The Business Checking Freedom Act 
of 2003.  The latter passed the House of Representatives but was not acted on in the Senate. 
The Treasury has not endorsed the proposals due to its potential budgetary burden (Abernathy 
2003). Certain small community banks are supporting the proposal (Maus 2003) on the grounds 
that sweep programs are expensive and complicated for small banks to implement, while others 
(Menzies 2003) like an alternative proposal (HR 974) which would allow 24 transfers from 
MMDA to BTA each month instead of the present 6.  
 
  Although retail deposit sweep programs have been operating for more than a decade —
and banks have earned millions of dollars by their use—there are no published papers modeling 
their implementation, operation, or optimal tuning.  These programs have reduced the amount of 
banks’ sterile reserves from $26.3 billion in Jan 1994 to about $10.7 billion in February 2005 
(Figure 2).  Even assuming a conservative 100 basis points spread on interest rates, the implied 
earnings are $156 million per year.  Clearly this is an interesting optimization problem, with high 
earnings potential. This paper attempts to begin to bridge this gap in literature. 
 
2.   Systems for Sweep Programs  
 
There are a number of algorithms for operating retail deposit sweep programs.  Perhaps the 
earliest algorithm was the simplest: sweep funds from the transaction deposit into the MMDA at 
the close of business on Friday, and reverse the sweep at the opening of business on Monday; 
if Monday is a federal banking holiday, postpone the reverse transfer to Tuesday.  Because the 
Federal Reserve’s statutory reserve requirements are calculated from end-of-day balances on a 
7-day week, this algorithm immediately reduces the amount of transaction deposits subject to 
reserve requirements.  Considerable improvement, however, can be obtained by more 
sophisticated methods that we discuss next.    
 
In banks, sweep programs are part of the treasury cash management function.  While a 
variety of algorithms undoubtedly exist, anecdotal evidence suggests that two are the most 
popular.  For discussion, we label them the threshold method and the cushion method. Both 
these methods try to leverage high-frequency information on customer behavior (daily patterns 
of net credits and debits) to optimize the division of funds, over the month, between the BTA 
and MMDA accounts, subject to the constraint of no more than six transfer limit from MMDA to 
BTA.  Note that there is no limit on transfers from the BTA to the MMDA account, although each An Inventory Problem in Banks: Optimizing Retail Sweeps 
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such transfer may have a small cost for the bank. Recall that if five transfers have already been 
made for an account, it generally is optimal on the sixth transfer to move the entire MMDA 
balance to BTA.  This can be expensive.  If an institutional customer has $10 million in their 
account and all of it gets transferred to BTA, the reserves will have to be increased by $1 
million, for which no interest is earned by the bank.  All subsequent activity after the dumping of 
all MMDA funds to BTA, both debit and credit, is done via the BTA. 
 
For both methods, it is important to keep in mind that the month-by-month six transfer 
limit imposes a complex time-dependent structure on the functions that define the optimal 
outcomes.  In general, we will show that the thresholds, cushion amounts, and optimal transfers 
in both directions depend on the position of each specific business day within the calendar 
month.  
 
Threshold Method: In this method, for each accountholder, a threshold is set for the BTA 
account balance.  Because there is no restriction on the number of transfers from the BTA to 
MMDA, and because we assume zero cost of such transfers, optimality always requires that all 
incoming funds be credited to the BTA.  If the account balance in the BTA just prior to the end of 
the business day exceeds that day’s optimal threshold, excess funds are moved from BTA to 
MMDA before the close of business.  If posting incoming debits against the BTA implies a 
negative balance at the end of business, funds are transferred from the MMDA to the BTA.  In 
our models, we assume that the six transfer rule is a hard constraint.  As a result, on the sixth 
transfer, all funds in the MMDA are moved to the BTA.  In fact, this is a stochastic economic 
decision, and part of the optimal solution.  A bank which chooses not to move all funds from the 
MMDA to the BTA on the sixth transfer is placing a bet that a seventh transfer will not be 
necessary before the end of the month when a new set of six transfers begins.  Determining the 
correct option price for this bet is beyond the scope of this paper, and part of our current 
research.   In this algorithm, the amount transferred is equal to the threshold plus the amount of 
negative balance, leaving a balance of the threshold amount in BTA after the transfer.  In 
operation, this method seeks to maintain the BTA balance within an acceptable band. The 
parameters for this method are the thresholds values.  The minimum level here is zero. The 
method can be generalized to a situation where the minimum level is set to a value greater than 
zero, in which case the parameters are the minimum and maximum thresholds. 
 An Inventory Problem in Banks: Optimizing Retail Sweeps 
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Cushion Method: In this approach, incoming customer funds (deposits) throughout the month 
are credited to the MMDA so long as the transfer count from MMDA to BTA is less than six. 
Since debits can only be serviced from the BTA account, the first debit transaction initiates a 
transfer from MMDA to BTA of the debit amount plus a day-specific cushion amount. The 
optimal amount generally should be large enough to service a few more debit transactions. 
When the balance in the BTA is not sufficient to service a subsequent debit transaction, another 
transfer from MMDA to BTA is initiated. This transfer again includes funds to service the current 
debit transaction and a cushion amount, which, in general, will differ from the first cushion 
amount. This pattern is repeated as needed up to five transfers. The parameters in this method 
are the cushion amount for each transfer. 
 
  Although these two methods both can be considered similar to the (s,S) and (r,Q) 
models in inventory management, the algorithms are not isomorphic, that is, we have been 
unable to establish (stochastic) circumstances in which the two methods yield the same account 
balances and profit.  In both methods, the item being inventoried is cash, that is, deposits at 
Federal Reserve Banks. The methods differ primarily in two respects.  First, the algorithms differ 
in where the deposits are made. In the threshold method it is to the BTA, in the cushion method 
it is to the MMDA.  In current work, we are exploring optimal strategies for allocating deposits 
between the two accounts.  Second, they differ in their treatment of the sixth transfer from 
MMDA to BTA.  In further work, we are exploring the optimal handling of the risk incurred by not 
moving all funds on the sixth transfer.  Finally, as noted above, the s and r are set to zero, 
though this is not necessary and the methodology could benefit from not restricting these to 
zero.  
 
  Discussions with bank treasury managers suggest that most models used in practice to 
implement sweep programs are very simplistic.  In the threshold method, for example, often little 
variation is permitted by day; in some cases, managers allow the threshold to vary by transfer 
count ($1000 for first transfer into BTA, $2000 for second transfer, etc.) but not by day of the 
month.  Further, managers may use the same threshold for all accounts, regardless of size and 
transaction patterns.  In addition, the same threshold sometimes is used for transferring 
balances out of BTA to MMDA and for moving funds back from the MMDA.  In the next section, 
we show that different thresholds for these two types of transfers yield superior earnings relative 
to one threshold, and that thresholds which vary by day of month and account activity yield 
further earnings improvements.  An Inventory Problem in Banks: Optimizing Retail Sweeps 
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  Although not discussed further in this analysis, discussions suggest that managers often 
use similar methods for the cushion approach, with cushion amounts that vary by transfer count 
(say a cushion of $1000 for the first transfer, $2000 for the second transfer, etc.), but not vary by 
customer activity or day of month. In the balance of this paper, we examine the threshold 
method.  
 
  An illustration with two different sets of thresholds for the same account is shown in 
Figure 3. The detailed transaction data for each day is shown in Appendix 2 and 3 for the two 
cases shown in Figure 3. In the case on the left, all six transfers become necessary, and 
therefore the sixth transfer dumps the entire MMDA balance into BTA. All subsequent 
transactions are in BTA. This is an expensive outcome due to a poor choice of thresholds. In the 
case on the right, because of a better set of thresholds is used, only five transfers are 
necessary. Therefore, the BTA balance is kept low.  
 
Figure 3:  The result on MMDA and BTA balances of using different 
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3.   A Stochastic Dynamic Programming Model  
 
We develop a stochastic dynamic programming model for this problem.  For tractability and 
presentation here, the data in our model is somewhat less rich than the data that a bank 
treasury manager would have available for use in such a model.  Most banks retain customer 
account activity (debits and credits) for at least several recent months, including daily account 
balances and net transaction activity. (The net transaction activity is the net of all deposits and 
withdrawals posted to the account during the day. Positive numbers correspond to net deposits, 
negative numbers to net withdrawals, and zeros to no activity during the day.)  Because the 
stochastic model could get very unwieldy if actual real-number dollar transaction values are 
used, we choose to model using discrete transaction intervals.  Suppose there are n transaction 
intervals in the model. For example, if we choose to model with 8 transaction intervals for net 
activity, the intervals may be defined to correspond to daily net transaction activity of <-10000, -
10,000 to -5001, -5000 to 1, 0, 1 to 5000, 5001 to 7500, 7501 to 15000, >15000. Note that the 
interval breakpoints do not need to be symmetric, of equal size, or have as many withdrawal 
intervals and deposit intervals. However, it is important to have one interval for no activity, 0, 
since on many days there may not be any net activity.  
 
Using the historical transaction data, a (nxn) size transition matrix is created. See Figure 
4 for an example with 5 intervals. The entries of the transition matrix, pij, correspond to the 
probability of having a net transaction in interval i on one day, and a transaction in interval j the 
next day, where 1 = ∑
j
ij p , for all i. 
Figure 4: Transition matrix for net transaction activity for an account 
No
Large Small activity Small  Large Amount
Large 7% 46% 33% 7% 7% -$3,500
Small 5% 49% 35% 6% 5% -$500
4% 35% 49% 6% 6% $0
Small  4% 44% 41% 6% 5% $500
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 Let  si (i ∈ {1,…,n}) be the average net transaction amount for each interval (last column of 
Figure 4), where si is negative for withdrawal intervals and positive for deposit intervals, A denote 
the MMDA balance at the beginning of the month, lm denote the MMDA balance, and b denote the 
BTA balance on day t.   Suppose the net transaction on day t is in transaction interval i and x 
transfers from MMDA to BTA have been made to date. Let X be the maximum allowable transfers.  
As per current Federal Reserve regulations, X is 6. At the beginning of the month x=0, and we 
constrain this number to be less than or equal to  X at the end of the month. Suppose there are T 
working days in the month. Then the state of the system in day t can be specified by (m,b,i,x). Let 
) , , , ( x i b m f
T
t  be the maximal discounted net present value of being in state (m,b,i,x) in period t in 
the T period problem when optimal actions are taken in each day from t through T.  The actions 
pertain to choosing the correct thresholds when transfers become necessary.  We will use different 
thresholds for transfers into BTA and out of BTA.  
 
Let rmb be the single-day revenue realized from an MMDA balance of m and a BTA 
balance of b, 
 
 
where r  is the interest rate spread that the bank earns on balances (expected marginal asset 
yield minus its average cost of funds), and δ  is the (marginal) fraction of BTA balances that the 
bank needs to maintain as sterile reserves. Under current regulations, δ  is approximately 0.1, 
or 10%. 
 
Figure 5: MMDA and BTA balances in various cases of account activity.  
  The transfer into BTA threshold is g and the transfer out of BTA threshold is h. 
MMDA BTA  MMDA BTA 
Case 1 m b Withdrawal 0 <= b+si < g No transfer m b+si
Case 2 m b Withdrawal b+si < 0, Transfer count < 6 Transfer g-(b+si) from MMDA to BTA m-[g-(b+si)] g+ 1
Case 3 m b Withdrawal  Transfer count = 6 Transfer entire MMDA balance to BTA 0 m+b+si
Case 4 m b No activity b No transfer m b
Case 5 m b Deposit b+si <= h No transfer m b+si
Case 6 m b Deposit b+si > h Transfer h-(b+si) from BTA to MMDA m+[(b+si)-h] h
Balance at start 
of day Transfer 
count






BTA balance 5 minutes 
before end of business  Transfer
) ] 1 [ ( b m r rmb δ − + =An Inventory Problem in Banks: Optimizing Retail Sweeps 
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Let β be the single-day discount factor. Then the cases that need to be considered 
depending on the state of the system and the account activity is shown in Figure 5.  In what 
follows, as shorthand, we refer to the hard constraint that all funds in the MMDA must be moved 
to the BTA on the sixth transfer as a “dump” of the funds back to the BTA. 
 
The following recursive functional equations specify the model: 
 
Withdrawals (si is negative):  
 
Case 1 and Case 2 (No dump needed): Suppose the transaction is a withdrawal (that is, b>si), 
then we need to select a withdrawal threshold, g, that solves the following recursion. 
   













)] 1 , , )], ( [ ( [ : 0
)] , , , ( [ : 0
sup ) , , , (
1
1
0 x j g s b g m f p s b
x j b m f p g s b















         
(1) 
   
                       
Case 3 (Dump needed): Suppose a transfer from MMDA is necessary and the transfer count 
x≥X, since all the MMDA balance gets transferred to BTA, we have 
   






t β                 
(2) 
   
                       
No activity (si is zero):  
 
Case 4 (No activity): Suppose the transaction is no activity, and the transfer count x< X, then no 
transfer is made. 
   






t + ∑ + = β                       
(3) 
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Deposits (si is positive):  
 
Case 5 and Case 6 (Deposits): Suppose the transaction is a deposit, we wish to determine a 
deposit threshold, h, that solves the following recursion 
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1
0 x j h s b h m f p h s b
x j b m f p h s b















                      
(4) 
   
 
Boundary conditions: The boundary condition for this model is  
 
x i b m x i b m f
T
T , , , 0 ) , , , ( ∀ =                                                        (5) 
We solve this model by recursively solving the functional equation ) 0 , 0 , 0 , ( 0 A f
T , where A 
is the initial balance in the account. 
 
We have found the above model—a mixed discrete-continuous DP model—difficult to 
solve.  The threshold amounts for withdrawals, g, and for deposits, h, are continuous real 
numbers, while the si values are discrete.  Further, the model has several ridges where 
derivatives are not continuous due both to zero-bound restrictions such as BTA and MMDA 
balances cannot be negative, and to the hard constraint of no more than six transfers per month 
from MMDA to BTA.  To solve the model, we simplified the problem so as to use discrete, rather 
than mixed discrete-continuous, solution methods.  Our choices of discrete threshold values are 
discussed in the next section. 
 
3. 1  The Model with Discrete Thresholds  
 
Suppose g1, g2,…,gz and h1, h2,…,hy are discrete strictly increasing thresholds, where 
0<g1<g2…<gz and 0<h1<h2…<hz.   Because the threshold needs to be sufficient to cover at least 
one future withdrawal, g1 and h1 should be at least as large as the absolute value of the smallest An Inventory Problem in Banks: Optimizing Retail Sweeps 
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average withdrawal, si, among the withdrawal intervals. Also, gz could be the maximum possible 
threshold that can be transferred without resulting in a negative MMDA balance, that is, 
) 0 : ( max > − + + = g s b m g g i z . Similarly,  ) 0 ) ( : ( max > − + + = h s b b h h i y .    We will show 
later in Figure 7 that these threshold end-points can be selected to make the computations 
much more efficient. For now, we can modify (1) for discrete thresholds as follows for 
withdrawals: 
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(6)
   
 
Similarly, we can modify (4) for discrete deposit thresholds as follows: 
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4.  Structural Results 
 
Our model is a version of the sequential assignment problem (Derman, Lieberman and Ross 
1972, Ross 1983) and very similar to the game “So who’s counting” (Puterman 1994). In that 
game, two teams compete to assemble the largest 5-digit number from a set of 0-9 digits 
randomly and sequentially picked by a spinner in five spins. The teams may place each of the 
digits that are picked by the spinner in one of the five available slots for digits (the units, tens, 
hundreds, thousands and ten thousands positions). The team that has a larger number after the 
five spins wins. In this game, obviously if the first spin results in a 9, one should put it in the first 
available slot, and if the first spin results in a 0, one should place it in the last available slot. The 
placement of other digits may not be as obvious, but it turns out that there is an optimal policy 
that specifies where each digit should be placed given that it is picked in a particular spin. The 
policy may not result in wins every time, but will be best in the long run if the game is repeatedly 
played. In this problem there are two dimensions, the spin number and the observed number in 
a spin. The proof of the optimal policy uses the fact that the value of the solution is monotonic in 
both these dimensions.  
 
  To see that our problem is similar, think of a game where T (the number of working days 
in the month) spins are allowed, and in each spin, one of 6 transfer counts, x∈{0,…,5} may be 
observed. The analog to the placement of the digits is the threshold value. In our problem, there 
are three dimensions – t, x, and (m+b). We will show next that the value of the 
solution, ) , , , ( x i b m f
T
t , is monotonic in each of these dimensions. 
 
Lemma 1:   
a)  ) , , , ( x i b m f
T
t  is non-increasing in t for all m, b, i, x and T 
b)  ) , , , ( x i b m f
T
t  is non-decreasing in x for all m, b, i, t and T 
c)  ) , , , ( x i b m f
T
t  is non-decreasing in m+b  for all i, t, x, and T 
 
Proof:  We prove these results by induction. For (a), note that the result is true at t=T-1 from (5). 
Suppose the result were true at t+1. Then from (1)-(4), (6) and (7), it follows that the result is An Inventory Problem in Banks: Optimizing Retail Sweeps 
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true at t. The result follows by induction. For (b), note that at x=X, the result is true because of 
the dumping of the entire MMDA to BTA in (2). Then supposing that the result were true at x+1, 
it follows from (6) and (7) that the result is true at x. The result then follows by induction. (c) 
follows from the definition of  mb r .             
 
Suppose the optimal thresholds in state (m,b,i,x) in period t is 
*
tmbix g  and 
*
tmbix h , where 
from (6) for withdrawals. 
   
                                                     ) , , , ( max arg
* x i b m f g
T
t tmbix =    
   
 
  And from (7), for deposits 
   
                                                     ) , , , ( max arg
* x i b m f h
T
t tmbix =    
   
 
Then using the result in Ross (1983), we can present the following theorem. 
 
Theorem 1:  
a) 
*
tmbix g  and 
*
tmbix h  are non-increasing in t for all m, b, i, x and T 
b) 
*
tmbix g  and 
*
tmbix h  are non-decreasing in x for all m, b, i, t and T 
 
Proof: The proof follows from Ross (1983, page 125, Proposition 7.2) and Lemma 1 above. An Inventory Problem in Banks: Optimizing Retail Sweeps 
 




Figure 6:  An illustration of optimal thresholds for sweeps,  
m=6500, b=0 and data in Figure 4 
Large Withdrawal Thresholds, 
*
1x tmb g     Small Withdrawal Thresholds, 
*
2x tmb g  




26-t  1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
25  1000            1000     
24  1000  1000       1000 1000      
23  1000 1000 1500       1000 1000 2000    
22  1000 1000 1500 2500     1000 1000 1500  4500  
21  500 500  1000  2500 3000   1000 1000 1500  4500  6000
20  500 500  1000  2500 3000   1000 1000 1500  4500  6000
:  : : : : :   : : :  :  :
5  0 0 0  500 1000   0 0 0  500 1000
4  0 0 0 0 500   0 0 0  0  500
3  0 0 0 0 500   0 0 0  0  500
2  0 0 0 0 500   0 0 0  0  0
1  0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0  0  0
 
Small Deposit Thresholds, 
*
4x tmb h     Large Deposit Thresholds, 
*
5x tmb h  




26-t  1  2  3  4  5     1  2  3  4  5 
25  500        1000        
24  500  500       1000 1500      
23  500  500  500       1000 1000 1500    
22  500 500 500 500     1000 1000 1500  2000   
21  500 500 500 500 500   500 1000 1500  2000  5000
20  500 500 500 500 500   500 1000 1500  2000  5000
:  : : : : :   : : :  :  :
5  0 0 0  500 500   0 0 0  500  1000
4  0 0 0 0 500   0 0 0  0  1000
3  0 0 0 0 500   0 0 0  0  500
2  0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0  0  0
1  0 0 0 0 0   0 0 0  0  0An Inventory Problem in Banks: Optimizing Retail Sweeps 
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An illustration of the optimal thresholds for four cases of total balance is shown in Figure 
6. Note that in each case the threshold values are non-decreasing from the southwest corner of 
the table to the northeast corner (which is statements (a) and (b) of Theorem 1). Also, the 
maximum threshold in each case is the maximum possible. For example, in the top left case of 
large withdrawal thresholds, note that the MMDA balance is $6500, the BTA balance is $0, and 
the amount of the transaction from Figure 4 is -$3500. Thus after this transaction is complete, 
the total MMDA+BTA balance is $3000. The table is asking for all of this to be transferred to 
BTA as the threshold shown is $3000, if you have already made 5 transfers and have 21 days 
to go to the end of the month. Of course, as the table indicates, the threshold will be lower if you 
have fewer transfers done by that date. 
 
The thresholds shown in Figure 6 are in sharp contrast to the simple thresholds used by 
many banks. For example, a set of thresholds may be 500, 500, 1000, 1500, and 2000 for 
transfer counts 1 through 5. These thresholds may be the same for all days of the month, and 
for all transaction types. Further, these may be only marginally adjusted for different customer 
types.  
 
On the contrary, we are suggesting many more segments (see next section) and as the 
table indicates, thresholds that vary by day of month and transaction type. 
  
  The result of Theorem 1 allows us to limit the search for thresholds and make the model 
much more efficient. For example, from Figure 6, for the case on the top left (MMDA=6500 and 
BTA=0), the search for the optimal threshold with 21 days to go, transfer number of 3, can be 
limited to the range between the number below and the number on the right, that is (1000,2500). 
We can formalize this using the following result. 
 
Corollary 1:  The search for 
*
tmbix g  can be limited to the range  ) , (
*
) 1 ( ) 1 (
*
) 1 ( + + + x mbi t mbix t g g  
Proof: Follows immediately from Theorem 1.              
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  In order to use this result, we can implement the simple algorithm shown in Figure 7. 
This would allow solving for larger problems, with a larger number of transaction intervals, for 
example. A larger number of intervals will result in a finer granularity of modeling transaction 
intervals and average transaction amounts. 
 
5.  Implementation Issues 
 
The simplifications due to discrete thresholds and the efficiencies gained by application of the 
above algorithm for reduced search result in the model taking less than a minute on a 1.5GB 
personal computer for a problem with 7 transaction intervals for each value of initial MMDA 
balance A. However, a few additional steps may be taken to simplify implementation. 
 
Account Segmentation: Notwithstanding the fact that the model is fast and efficient, it may not 
be practical to run the model for each account holder. Therefore, similar accounts may be 
grouped into segments and the model run for each segment instead. Appropriate segmentation 
Figure 7: Algorithm for limiting cushion search for g (h is similar) 
Set 
*
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variables may include the average MMDA and BTA balance for the account, and transaction 
behavior (such as number of transactions per month, average size of net transactions and the 
volatility of net transaction amounts). 
 
Balance Segmentation: Even within an account segment it is not prudent to have a threshold 
table as shown in Figure 6 for each value of balance. That would require numerous tables and 
will make implementation difficult. Since ranges of balance will have similar threshold amounts, 
it makes eminent sense to group balance amounts into segments and have a single lookup 
table of thresholds for each balance segment. Another approach may be to use a regression 
model to relate threshold values developed at different balance segments to the total balance 
level in each segment. This regression equation could then be used to return a threshold value 
for any possible total balance on a continuous scale. 
 
Scaling of dollar amounts: Another simplification would be to scale si and the beginning of the 
month MMDA amount A using some convenient scaling factor. For example, in a 5 transaction 
interval case, if the si are -2100, -150, 0, 300 and 3750 respectively, and A is 1500, then 150 
may be a convenient scaling factor (the greatest common divisor of the absolute values of si, 
except for the 0) that coverts si into -14, -1,0,2 and 25 respectively, and A to 10. The thresholds 
should then also be scaled using the same factor. In this example, a threshold g1 of 150 will get 
converted to 1. It may be convenient to use g2,…,gz that are multiples of g1, for example, g2=2, 
g3=3, etc. We have found that if the numbers do not scale exactly, approximate scaling works 
well too. 
 
Modeling customer behavior: An understanding of customer behavior is critical to 
determination of optimal thresholds. For retail banks with predominantly household accounts, 
there are some transactions that are more predictable than needs to be modeled by way of a 
transition matrix. For example, income may be deposited biweekly and is predictable, mortgage 
payments are predictable, credit card payments are on cycle dates are predictable at least for 
date, if not for amount. Even the amount can be predicted with some accuracy. Similarly, utility 
bills are at known dates and fairly stable. Only other sundry and less predictable expenses need 
to be modeled using the transition matrix. Our stochastic dynamic approach can easily 
accommodate these refinements to make the model more efficient. 
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6.  Conclusions 
 
We have presented a simple stochastic dynamic programming model for determining the 
optimal thresholds to reduce sterile reserves in retail banks. We have also presented structural 
results to make the search for thresholds more efficient, allowing for solving larger problems. In 
simulations using real data, our model was found to be effective in reducing sterile reserves and 
is being implemented.  
  
  Proposed legislation, if passed by the Congress and signed into law, might make 
obsolete retail deposit sweep programs by increasing the number of transfers allowed per 
month or allowing the Federal Reserve to pay interest on all Federal Reserve Bank deposits.  
Using our model it is straight forward to assess the impact of these changes. Increasing the 
number of allowed monthly transfers from 6 to 24 unambiguously relaxes a binding constraint, 
resulting in a reduced level of sterile reserves and increased earnings.  The effect of the 
measure to pay interest on reserve balances with the Fed depends on how much interest is 
actually paid.  Most proposals constrain the Fed to paying significantly less than the overnight 
federal funds rate.  To the extent that the rate is less than the bank’s expected interest-rate 
spread, the need for judicious sweeps would still exist. Both of these measures, if passed, 
would reduce the earnings realized by banks from our model in relative terms (since threshold 
amounts will be less critical), but our model would still be valuable in determining effective 
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Appendix 1:  The Federal Reserve and Retail Deposit Sweep Programs 
 
Retail deposit sweep programs were introduced by a large U.S. commercial bank in January 
1994.  In such a program, the bank creates money market deposit accounts that are invisible to 
its customers and re-classifies customers’ transaction deposits as MMDA (that is, savings) 
deposits so as to avoid the 10 percent marginal statutory reserve requirement ratio on 
transaction accounts; savings deposits, including MMDA, are currently subject to a zero percent 
reserve requirement ratio.  The 1982 Garn-St. Germain act, which created the money market 
deposit account as a deposit instrument, prohibited the Federal Reserve Board from classifying 
such deposits as transaction accounts for reserve-requirement purposes.  This prohibition is an 
essential element of the operation of retail deposit sweep programs.  Historically, banks have 
introduced many inventory management schemes to reduce the amount of deposits at Federal 
Reserve Banks.  But, prior to retail deposit sweep programs, the Federal Reserve Board 
promptly ended all such schemes.  In most cases, it ruled that the scheme was primarily 
intended to evade statutory requirements and ordered that the affected deposits be subject to 
the same reserve requirement as other transaction deposits.  One of the more clever exploits in 
sweeps occurred during the early 1990s.  In that case, a large bank began sweeping transaction 
deposits into large-denomination time deposits with seven-day maturities.  By placing one-
seventh of the swept funds into each of seven different large time deposits maturing on different 
days of the week, it sought to provide transaction services to its customers while reducing the 
amount of end-of-day balances subject to statutory reserve requirements.  The Federal Reserve 
Board ruled that this was solely a scheme to evade reserve requirements (as, of course, it was), 
and re-classified the involved large time as transaction deposits subject to the same reserve 
requirements as the initial transaction deposits.  With its earnings motive destroyed, the bank 
dropped the sweeping activity. 
 
    The six-transfer rule for MMDA is mandated by the Garn-St. Germain act, and 
promulgated to banks as part of the Federal Reserve’s Regulation D.  Specifically, the law sets 
a maximum of six pre-authorized plus third-party payments per month.  It does not limit the 
number of in-person customer withdrawals or transfers.  If a customer makes more than 6 such 
transfers during a month (say, via check), a bank may impose a penalty on the customer but the 
bank need not report such a violation to the Federal Reserve, which, in turn, is unlikely to 
impose any penalty on the bank.  If a bank regularly or frequently permits more than six such 
withdrawals by taking no action to require customer compliance with the statutory limit, the 
MMDA balances may be classified by the Federal Reserve as transaction deposits (rather than 
MMDA) and hence subject to the same reserve requirements as other transaction deposits.  
The bank also may be subject to administrative penalties.   
 
  We model statutory reserve requirements as a constant 10 percent marginal 
requirement.  Actual statutory requirements on transaction deposits are tiered, with a zero 
percent ratio applying to approximately the first $5 million, a 3 percent ratio applying to 
approximately the next $50 million, and, since 1992, a 10 percent ratio applying to the 
remainder.  These break points are indexed to growth in total bank deposits and change 
annually.  In 1980, the highest marginal reserve requirement was 12 percent; it was reduced to 
10 percent in 1992.  For larger banks, the lower tiers matter not at all. 
 
    The role of the Federal Reserve Board, which sets statutory reserve requirements, was 
an important issue with some analysts and consultants during their early years of retail deposit 
sweep programs. The 1980 Monetary Control Act set a zero ratio for personal time and savings 
deposits.  In 1990, the ratios for non-personal time and savings deposits, and for Eurocurrency 
liabilities, were reduced from 3 percent to zero.  Strictly speaking, these deposit liabilities remain An Inventory Problem in Banks: Optimizing Retail Sweeps 
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subject to Federal Reserve statutory reserve requirements but at a zero ratio, and the Federal 
Reserve Board retains the power to increase these percentages in the future, if desired.  Are the 
invisible MMDA created as part of a retail deposit sweep program personal or non-personal 
accounts?  Some analysts argued that the accounts, although created by banks without their 
customers’ knowledge, are personal savings deposits and hence protected from a non-zero 
ratio by the Monetary Control Act.  Other analysts argued that the accounts were created solely 
by the bank as a component of the bank’s inventory management system for deposits at the 
Federal Reserve Banks, should be regarded as non-personal deposits which, if the Federal 
Reserve Board desired, could be made subject to a considerably higher ratio.   
 
  Although it is clear that operation of a retail deposit sweep program reduces the amount 
of sterile reserves held by banks, it is difficult to estimate how much of the related earnings have 
been retained by banks and how much has been realized by consumers via market competition 
(even though the underlying inventory technology is invisible to the customer).  Recent data 
suggest that some portion has been realized by consumers; see Anderson (2002b).   It has 
been reported that, more recently, some business customers have become aware of the sweep-
into-MMDA scheme, and have requested—and received—a significant share of the resulting 
earnings.  It seems obvious that virtually all households are unaware of the operation of such 
sweep programs.   
   
  There are many additional and complex aspects of bank reserve management that 
interact with managing deposits at Federal Reserve Banks and retail sweep programs, but 
these are beyond the scope of this paper.  Reserve balances, shown in Figure 2, comprise only 
about half of the deposits held by banks at the Federal Reserve.  The other half are similar 
deposits but encumbered by clearing balance contracts with the Federal Reserve; under the 
terms of such contracts, the banks earn interest on the deposits if actual amounts meet or 
exceed contractual minimums, but incur penalties for shortfalls.  The fungibility of deposits 
makes reserve management complex because deposits held to satisfy clearing balance 
contracts can, instead, be used to satisfy statutory reserve requirements.  In fact, Federal 
Reserve accounting rules require that available deposits at Federal Reserve Banks first be 
applied to satisfy statutory reserve requirements and only the excess of such deposits may be 
applied toward satisfying a clearing balance contract.  Modeling capable of handling the 
dynamics of this stochastic process are beyond the models in this paper.An Inventory Problem in Banks: Optimizing Retail Sweeps 
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Appendix 2: Net transactions and MMDA and BTA balances for an account when a 
threshold of $3000 is used for withdrawals and deposits 
 
 
  Start of day   
5 mins 
before 
EOB  Transfer to  End of day  Transfer 










EOB)  Count 
1 75000  0  -3000  -3000  0  6000  69000  3000  1 
2 69000  3000  -750  2250  0  0  69000  2250  1 
3 69000  2250  -25500  -23250  0  26250  42750  3000  2 
4 42750  3000  1000  4000  1000  0  43750  3000  2 
5 43750  3000  0  3000  0  0  43750  3000  2 
6 43750  3000  -2500  500  0  0  43750  500  2 
7 43750  500  0  500  0  0  43750  500  2 
8 43750  500  500  1000  0  0  43750  1000  2 
9 43750  1000  0  1000  0  0  43750  1000  2 
10 43750  1000  -30500  -29500  0  32500  11250  3000  3 
11 11250  3000  0  3000  0  0  11250  3000  3 
12 11250  3000  -1500  1500  0  0  11250  1500  3 
13 11250  1500  500  2000  0  0  11250  2000  3 
14 11250  2000  0  2000  0  0  11250  2000  3 
15 11250  2000  50900  52900  49900  0  61150  3000  3 
16 61150  3000  -100  2900  0  0  61150  2900  3 
17 61150  2900  -4200  -1300  0  4300  56850  3000  4 
18 56850  3000  0  3000  0  0  56850  3000  4 
19 56850  3000  0  3000  0  0  56850  3000  4 
20 56850  3000  10500  13500  10500  0  67350  3000  4 
21 67350  3000  -9500  -6500  0  9500  57850  3000  5 
22 57850  3000  34000  37000  34000  0  91850  3000  5 
23 91850  3000  -11500  -8500  0  86350  0  86350  6 
24 0  86350  -100  86250  0  0  0  86250  6 
25 0  86250  0  86250  0  0  0  86250  6 
26 0  86250  0  86250  0  0  0  86250  6 
27 0  86250  -300  85950  0  0  0  85950  6 
28 0  85950  12500  98450  0  0  0  98450  6 
29 0  98450  0  98450  0  0  0  98450  6 
30 0  98450  -2000  96450  0  0  0  96450  6 An Inventory Problem in Banks: Optimizing Retail Sweeps 
 




Appendix 3: Net transactions and MMDA and BTA balances for an account when a 
threshold of $5000 is used for withdrawals and deposits 
 
 
  Start of day   
5 mins 
before 
EOB  Transfer to  End of day  Transfer 










EOB)  Count 
1 75000  0  -3000 -3000 0 8000 67000  5000  1
2 67000  5000  -750 4250 0 0 67000  4250  1
3 67000  4250  -25500 -21250 0 26250 40750  5000  2
4 40750  5000  1000 6000 1000 0 41750  5000  2
5 41750  5000  0 5000 0 0 41750  5000  2
6 41750  5000  -2500 2500 0 0 41750  2500  2
7 41750  2500  0 2500 0 0 41750  2500  2
8 41750  2500  500 3000 0 0 41750  3000  2
9 41750  3000  0 3000 0 0 41750  3000  2
10 41750  3000  -30500 -27500 0 32500 9250  5000  3
11 9250  5000  0 5000 0 0 9250  5000  3
12 9250  5000  -1500 3500 0 0 9250  3500  3
13 9250  3500  500 4000 0 0 9250  4000  3
14 9250  4000  0 4000 0 0 9250  4000  3
15 9250  4000  50900 54900 49900 0 59150  5000  3
16 59150  5000  -100 4900 0 0 59150  4900  3
17 59150  4900  -4200 700 0 0 59150  700  3
18 59150  700  0 700 0 0 59150  700  3
19 59150  700  0 700 0 0 59150  700  3
20 59150  700  10500 11200 6200 0 65350  5000  3
21 65350  5000  -9500 -4500 0 9500 55850  5000  4
22 55850  5000  34000 39000 34000 0 89850  5000  4
23 89850  5000  -11500 -6500 0 11500 78350  5000  5
24 78350  5000  -100 4900 0 0 78350  4900  5
25 78350  4900  0 4900 0 0 78350  4900  5
26 78350  4900  0 4900 0 0 78350  4900  5
27 78350  4900  -300 4600 0 0 78350  4600  5
28 78350  4600  12500 17100 12100 0 90450  5000  5
29 90450  5000  0 5000 0 0 90450  5000  5
30 90450  5000  -2000 3000 0 0 90450  3000  5